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Abstract
Extracting norms from legislative texts confronts us many tasks and requires de-
cisions about approaches, methods, tools, and legal theoretical presuppositions.
In this paper I present some examples from the Hungarian legislation showing
how challenging sometimes the wording of these texts is from the viewpoint of
norm extracting, then I present two limitations we need to face when dealing
with this task. On the one hand, I argue that isomorphism cannot be upheld, but
it is not necessary for having a faithful formalization. On the other, I argue that
however appealing to base on constitutive norms is when formalizing—in order
to avoid the necessity of normative reasoning, for instance—the consequential
application of their theory in the approach leads us to a very controversial
situation.
1 Introduction
In this paper some considerations of information extracting and formalizing law will
be presented. The focus of this investigation is on some of the phenomena of law
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and legislative texts we face and need to deal with if we want to extract norms from
the legislative texts and how these influence the methods we need to apply when
constructing our knowledge base system and formal setup.1 The examples used here
come from Hungarian law,2 but we have no reason to suppose that the phenomena
their structure and linguistic surface confront us would be particular.
I have no intention to argue for the legal positivist approach in the sense of advertis-
ing the absolute primacy of written law, but I restrict this examination to the legisla-
tive texts and the linguistic-legal information that can be extracted from them—by
human or machine tools (semi-automatized or automatized way). There are several
reasons for doing so. One is the Hungarian—and, in general, the continental—legal
system’s tacit relying on this approach in the sense of requiring clear legislative
texts free from ambiguities—as this is what people can access and according to
which they are required to behave, and the law has to be understandable by those
who are subjects of it. The decree regulating the legislative drafting in the Hungar-
ian legal system (61/2009. (XII. 14.) decree of the Minister of Justice) says: “Legal
regulation drafts should be drawn according to the rules of Hungarian language, in a
clear, comprehensive, consistent way” (Section 2). The reason why the examination
in this paper concerns not only the human understanding but the formal represen-
tation of laws too in order to prepare “machine understanding” is the amount of
laws: at the time of writing these lines there are 7156 statues in force, the (parallel)
processing of which is way beyond human capacity. We need to consider how (and
whether) the (semi-)automated formalization of legislative texts can be managed:
how (and whether) the (normative) content of a legislative text is clearly detectable
and identifiable.
Obviously, such a topic involves considerations not only from legal theory, but also
from computer science, natural language processing (hereafter, NLP) and logic. Nev-
ertheless, in this paper I do not suggest or even consider tools or methodologies for
NLP solutions for moving toward a (semi-)automated interpretation of legal texts, as
it happened—among many others—in Camilleri et al. [11], Boella et al. [9], de Maat
et al. [14], de Maat and Winkels [13] (for project results see Legivoc [18], Openlaws
[42], EUCases [8], MIREL, and the most recent DAPRECO [3] aiming at translating
1This paper is not self-contained in the sense of referring many existing and often discussed
issues without introducing or explaining them in detail. Therefore, the intended audience is the
audience of this special issue having background in and experience in mining and reasoning with
legal texts.
2The examples will be presented both in Hungarian and in—as faithfully to the original Hun-
garian texts’ wording as possible—English translation.
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the GDPR into a deontic logic specifically designed for natural language semantics
in Robaldo and Sun [31]—also related to ProLeMAS), neither will consider specific
formalisms—listing of which works would far exceed the limits and scope of this
paper;3 and from the knowledge base constructing issues I only will address those
that directly relate to the topics discussed here.
The methodology of this paper is presenting real legislative examples to show that
why and how seemingly basic steps of formalizing law and constracting legal knowl-
edge base can be difficult, especially if we consider automated analysis—which, as
I argued above, can easily made desirable by the amount of norms of a given legal
system. The investigation of the examples will show why the popular and intuitive
requirement of isomorphism cannot be upheld, and I will present arguments why
it should not even be necessarily pursued. The examples and arguments above will
also continuously reflect upon the semantics of legal norms and the differentiation
between constitutive and regulative ones, trying to find solutions to the difficulties
presented by the examples. This interaction between the examples and the argu-
ments will lead us to another limitation: the limitation of extensively formalizing
law in terms of constitutive norms.
2 Approach and Presuppositions
Let’s suppose: we are looking for norms in legislative texts. In agreement with the
approach of van Kralingen et al. [41] as “a norm must convey information to fulfil its
function of communicating standards of behaviour; the way in which one is expected
to behave must be clear from the norm”, we are looking for the way this can be ex-
tracted from the legislative texts (presupposing that they contain this information
as we think about them as sets of norms). The paper of van Kralingen et al. [41]
refers to Brouwer [10] when listing five questions to be answered if we want to have
a complete norm:
(1) Who is obliged or permitted to do something?
(2) Is there an obligation or a permission to do something or to leave something
undone?
(3) What must be done or forborne?
(4) Where must something be done or forborne?
(5) When must something be done or forborne?
These elements more or less correspond to the factors most authors count with when
3By no means this implies the claim that one or another specific formalism could not be better in
dealing with the issues presented in this paper, but here the focus is on preliminary considerations.
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discussing norms. In von Wright [43], the “father of deontic logic” adds the author-
ity to the elements above when talks about the parts or components of norms that
are prescriptions—as von Wright differentiates between three type of norms: rules
(rules of a game), directives (like technical norms of an instruction manual) and
prescriptions (commands, permissions, and prohibitions, which are given or issued
to agents concerning their conduct). “The laws of states are prescriptions”, declares
von Wright.
Let’s restrict our investigation to the character or deontic status (whether something
is obligatory, permitted or prohibited), the action (what is obligatory, permitted or
prohibited) and the agent (the subject or addressee of the norm: for whom it is
obligatory, permitted or prohibited the given action). The importance of agents is
often tacitly underestimated: it is pretty general to discuss deontic logic in an im-
personal way, that is, discuss obligations without agents, but in law there is always
an addressee of the given norm. And if we take the expectation in van Kralingen et
al. [41] above seriously accepting that a norm must convey how one is expected to
behave, extracting who that ‘one’ is a fundamental requirement of the whole pro-
cess. Let’s start with the character or deontic status, though, as it is reasonable to
suppose that this component is the most salient of the norms—and as we will see,
the question of the actions and agents come with it anyway.
3 Language of Legislative Texts: Deontic Character and
Linguistic Modalities in Law
The language use in legislation is more formal and bound than other registers of nat-
ural language (whether necessarily or not is often discussed, see the Plain English
Movement, Benson [7] vs. for instance Crump [12]), even more than other registers
in legal language (for instance compared to the language of judgements, contracts or
explanations).4 As we saw above, the legislator itself has formed requirements con-
cerning the legislative language use in a decree on legislative drafting. There are a lot
of features of the legal language use in Hungarian (for instance the high proportion
of nominal structures) discussed often by linguists and lawyers (this is, of course,
is not a specifically Hungarian issue, for English see e.g. Mellinkoff [28], Tiersma
and Solan [37], for a comparative study to English, French, German, and Latin see
Mattila [27]), but now we only consider those that are related to the expression of
linguistic modality as these are by which we can identify the deontic character of a
4Most of the comparative studies of a recent Hungarian project on this topic are only available
in Hungarian, see: Szabó [35], but one of them will be available in English soon: Ződi [44].
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norm: what is obligatory, what is forbidden and what is permitted.
In the Hungarian language, modalities can be expressed in different ways (not only
in Hungarian, of course, for a foundational entry see Kratzer [23]): the most typi-
cal ways are participles, auxiliary verbs with infinitives, and suffixes at the end of
the verbs. For instance, obligatory can be expressed with saying that something is
‘kötelező’ (which is the literal translation of ‘obligatory’), or ‘szükséges’ (which is
the literal translation of ‘necessary’)—in its deontic reading, with using the auxil-
iary verb ‘kell’ (which means what ‘must’ or ‘shall’ means in deontic sense), or with
the derivational suffix ‘-andó, -endő’ at the end of the verb denoting the action (for
instance, the translation of the word ‘fizetendő’ is ‘is to be paid’). Permission can
be expressed with the adverb/adjective ‘megengedett’ (which is the literal transla-
tion of ‘permitted’) or using the adjective ‘szabad’ (literally meaning ‘free to’), but
most frequently happens with the inflectional suffix ‘-hat, -het’ attached to the verb
which describes the action, or with the derivational suffix ‘-ható, -hető’ attached to
the verb (in the predicate place of the sentence) with a—tacit—copula: in this case
the translation of the word e.g. ‘fizethető’ ‘it may be paid’ or ‘it can be paid’ with
the deontic reading of ‘can’. That is, in the Hungarian legal language, these suffixes
play the role that in English is played by modal verbs ‘may’ and ‘can’ in their deon-
tic reading. These suffixes also have other readings (just like the word ‘szükséges’,
that is, ‘necessary’, obviously has), but in a legislative text the deontic context is
given—or, as Kratzer [23] calls it, the conversational background is bound: it is lit-
erally is ‘what the law provides’ as we are reading the law itself. Forbidden can be
expressed with the adjective ‘tilos’ (which is the closest version to the translation of
‘forbidden’), with the negation of permitted, that is, any of the indicated possibilities
above with a declarative use of ‘no’ (‘nem’ in Hungarian).
3.1 False Friends and Missing Modalities in Legislative Texts
Sometimes, though, other ways of expressing modalities can be faced with: ones that
might mislead the reader, both human and computer ones.
In Markovich [25] the language of the Hungarian Criminal Code (and its legal the-
oretical consequence) is discussed: as a criminal code lists the actions a society (a
legislator) considers the less desired, one would expect to meet the linguistic signs
of forbidden several times—but would disappoint as the only deontic modality that
can be detected in this legislative text is obligatory. The dominant form of sections
in the Hungarian Criminal Code’s special part (listing the felonies) is the following:
Example (1) “Aki mást megöl, bűntett miatt öt évtől tizenöt évig terjedő szabad-
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ságvesztéssel büntetendő.” (Any person who kills another human is to be punished
for five to fifteen years of imprisonment due to having committed a felony.) [Act C
of 2012 on the Criminal Code]
As we see, the command to the judge to punish the perpetrator of a forbidden
act is not attached to the prohibition: it is itself the expression of the act being
forbidden. Of course, the human interpretator understands that this realizes what
we usually refer to as ‘forbidden’, but the automated processing needs some input in
order to properly classify these norms—which, at least in Hungarian—could be the
string ‘büntetendő’ (is to be punished) as these norms are very regular: whenever
the computer finds this word, the declarative form verb of the given sentence will
provide the action to which we need to assign the deontic status of being forbidden.
A more surprising set of examples can be found in the Hungarian Highway Code.
There are several sentences in it like the following ones:
Example(s) (2)
“A fényjelző készülék folyamatos zöld fény jelzésnél kiegészítő hangjelzést is adhat”
(The light-signalling device may additionally beep while green.)
“A fény kibocsátására alkalmas jelzőtáblán a jelzőtábla fehér és fekete jelzései egy-
mással felcserélt színekkel is megjelenhetnek.” (The white and black markings on the
light signal board may appear with commuted colors.)
“A jelzőtábla alatt kiegészítő tábla adhat útmutatást a jelzőtábla jelzésének értelme-
zésére.” Under the traffic sign, an additional sign may give guidance how to interpret
the traffic sign.
“Az út mellett vagy közelében lévő egyes létesítményekről kék vagy barna alapszín?
jelzőtáblák adhatnak tájékoztatást.” (Information about the facilities passed by the
road may be given by blue or brown signposts.)
“Az (1) bekezdésben említett jelzőtáblák alatt elhelyezett kiegészítő táblán nyíl
jelezheti, hogy a tilalom hatálya a táblától kezdődően vagy a tábláig áll fenn.” (Ad-
ditional signpost with an arrow under the traffic signs mentioned in (1) may indicate
whether the prohibition starts or ends with the traffic sign.)
These ‘may’-s (the ‘-hat’, ‘-het’ suffixes in Hungarian) might seem permission at
first sight. We, of course, know that ‘may’, just like the given Hungarian suffixes,
can be used with other modal tastes—e.g. alethic or metaphysical, but before facing
these examples we did not expect to meet with them in legislative texts since, as it
was mentioned above, here the context is bound, or, as Kratzer [23] says, the con-
versational background is given since the resolving deontic reading can paraphrased
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as ‘in view of what law provides’—which is tacitly the case as we are reading the law
itself. But the modalities in examples (2) do not really make sense as permissions:
the legislator does not give a permission to the light-signalling device to beep. These
rather seem alethic possibilities. Does this mean that we need to introduce a new
modality into our formalization? I don’t think so. If we consider descriptive propo-
sitions, these possibilities can be expressed with a disjunction: the light-signalling
device beeps or it does not. But what is the deontic character of this rule then? Well,
it is an obligation to people using public roads to consider a light-signalling device
as such—both if it beeps and if it does not. So we found a conjunction of obligations
where the first impression—and the trained machine’s result would have—suggested
permission. Not an easy tension to resolve with automatic tools.
It also happens that there is no linguistic sign of any modality in a sentence. In
Kratzer [23] we find an example of a sentence missing any linguistic sign of a modal-
ity: the explanation Kratzer gives to “The car goes twenty miles an hour” is that “the
modality may be inherent in the verb” (p. 639). She does not mention cases, though,
where the deontic modality is present inherently in a verb. In legislative texts, ac-
tually, we often find seemingly declarative sentences lacking any linguistic sign of
modality. The reader probably says promptly: of course, those are constitutive rules.
Indeed, in case of constitutive rules, the lack of ‘shall’ or other phenomenon express-
ing normativity is not surprising, this is part of the description we got in Searle
[33] describing constitutive rules as mostly expressed in non-imperative, ‘counts-as’
rules. We also can take a step back in history and check what an earlier author
whom Searle also leans on: Rawls [30] describes practice rules as definitive ones,
which definitive feature is so strong that if we don’t follow these rules, we don’t
engage in the given action they define.
If we want to explain the using of indicative mood with this distinction, we need
to understood broadly the word ‘definition’, at least this is how it seems from the
Hungarian legislative language use. Let’s see the following examples:
Example (3) “Szünetel a biztosítás a fizetés nélküli szabadság ideje alatt.” (The
insurance intermits during the unpaid leave.) [Act LXXX of 1997 on Social Security]
We might say that the definition of insurance as an institution can be paraphrased
in a way it contains this aspects of intermitting. Maybe, we can also say something
similar in case of the following rule:
Example (4) “Ha leszármazó és szülő nincs vagy nem örökölhet, az örökhagyó háza-
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stársa egyedül örököl.” (If there is no descendant or parent, or if they are excluded
from succession, the surviving spouse inherits the entire estate.) [Act V of 2013 on
the Civil Code]
What does this mean in terms of the norm elements we are looking for? Just to
start with the first element we look for: what is the deontic character of these norms?
Is there one at all? Constitutive norms are usually something which help us avoid
dealing with deontic notions—and therefore deontic logic or normative reasoning.
But should we really lean on this option when constructing our knowledge base and
formalizing law? Actually, Searle never said that there is no obligation in counts-as
norms (what is more, speaks about deontic power in their case)—(even if this is
typically not the case) they might be expressed imperative. (And there are several
critiques of the theories of the whole differentiation between constitutive and regula-
tive norms, see for instance Giddens [16], Lagerspetz [24], Garcia [15], Tuomela [39],
Tummolini and Castelfranchi [38]). For instance rules listing the required elements
of an official document to count as an official document is a paradigmatic case what
we usually consider a constitutive rule. Still, the phrasing of the following sentence
suggests an obligation:
Example (5) “A meghatalmazás képviseleti jogot létesítő egyoldalú jognyilatkozat.
A meghatalmazást a képviselőhöz, az érdekelt hatósághoz, bírósághoz vagy ahhoz a
személyhez kell intézni, akihez a meghatalmazás alapján a képviselő jognyilatkozatot
jogosult tenni.” (A power of attorney is a unilateral act granting the right of rep-
resentation. The power of attorney shall be addressed to the agent, the competent
authority or court, or any person to whom the agent is authorized to make a legal
statement.)[Act V of 2013 on the Civil Code]
In von Wright [43] we also find a clear claim about the laws of the state being
prescriptions, per se, but let’s see what the strictly legal approach says.
Legislation as such is subject of a discipline called legistics or legistica taught at
law schools. Hungarian legistics textbooks—obviously—often discuss Hungarian leg-
islative language use, both in descriptive and prescriptive way (discussing how the
language should be used when phrasing legal norms). Considering our topic, we
can find the following in Tóth [40]: “In legal norms indicative mood is dominant.
Thus the norm text shuns expressions like ‘should’, ‘ought’, ‘necessary’, since the
indicative mood is imperative for the authorities, government agencies (e.g. rules of
competence, authorizing rules, rules of procedure); while, less often, to put emphasis,
norms expressing obligation literally too may occur—e.g. when the obliged agents
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are directly citizens, business organizations.”5 Unfortunately, the parsing tools for
the Hungarian language does not provide the possibility to check the correlation
between the addressees (personal scope) and the linguistic mood of expressing obli-
gations, the claim is still worth to deeper analysis. On the one hand it corresponds
nicely with the foundations of the regulative–constitutive rules distinction: as it is
often referred, the activities defined by constitutive rules are logically dependent
on the rules constituting them, so it is not strange if agents created by the law
conducting activities created by the law get their commands from rules having the
same linguistic features as the ones created them and their activities. On the other
hand, this claim of Tóth [40] says this indicative mood is imperative to them, that
is, sounds constitutive or not, these rules bear normativity, they convey imperatives.
This is confirmed by another textbook of legistics: Tamás [36] says that “in Hungar-
ian legislative texts the indicative mood means imperatives or obligation. (...) The
predicate in norms’ text is always a command, even if it has no linguistic sign.”6
This means that we need to look for and identify deontic character in all the laws’
sentences. The correlation indicated above might help is, but there are cases, where
this correlation between the official addressee and the phrasing does not hold, like
in the following example:
Example (6) “...a vállalkozás egyértelműen és jól látható módon felhívja a fogyasztó
figyelmét a 11.§-ban meghatározott információkra” (...the company calls the con-
sumer’s attention to the information detailed in section 11 in an univoque and visible
way) [45/2014 (II. 26.) Government decree on Detailed Rules of Contracts between
Consumer and Company]
Here the obliged agent is a company, that is, not an authority, the mood is still
indicative representing no modality. We might be appealed to conclude that all in-
dicative mood predicates cover obligations in legislative texts. For these cases the
NLP considerations can be made up with saying that in legislative texts all the verbs
in indicative mood—except for the ones in the antecedents of conditional rules7—
should be detected as obligatory. That is, in the case of example (6) finding ‘felhívja’
5“A jogi normákban egyeduralkodó a kijelentő mód. Ezért a norma szövege kerüli a “kell”,
“köteles”, “szükséges” kifejezést, mert a hatóságok, állami szervek számára a kijelentő mód imper-
atív (pl. hatásköri szabályok, felhatalmazó szabályok, eljárási szabályok), míg nyomatékosításként
ritkábban előfordulhat a kötelezést nyelvileg is kifejező norma, (...) például akkor, ha a kötelezettek
közvetlenül magányszemélyek, gazdálkodó szervezetek.”
6”Magyar nyelvű normaszövegekben a kijelentő mód felszólítást vagy kötelezést jelent. (...) A
normatív állítmány mindig rendelkezés, akkor is, ha nyelvileg nem az.”
7About the automated identifiability of the antecedent of conditional sentences in legislative
texts in Hungarian see Markovich et al. [26]
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(‘calls’) should be translated to a formal representation of ‘it is obligatory to call’.
But this solution does not help in examples above: in example (3) the verb is ‘in-
termits’ and the deontic content as ‘it is obligatory to intermit’ sounds strange, the
‘it is obligatory to inherit’ even more does so. The reason is that inheriting and
intermitting are not actions to which oblige someone—or something—would make
sense: the spouse has no influence on whether (s)he inherits, the insurance has even
less whether it intermits. The principle along which this problem might be solved in
NLP and ((semi-)automated) formalization is that instead of acts, we put proposi-
tions in the argument of the deontic operators at this level: ‘it is obligatory that the
insurance intermit’ and ‘it is obligatory that the spouse inherit’ makes much more
sense. The satisfaction is temporary, though, as this solution does not provide some
crucial information of compliance: whose obligation is that to make things so? In
example (6) we see the agent, but in example (3) and (4) the real agent is not in
the given sentence or section, and the extraction of this information sometimes is
not easy to the human reader either: it requires some legal knowledge where to look
for the answer. That is, constructing the knowledge base requires that legal knowl-
edge. Before going further with this direction, note that we already lose something:
isomorphism.
4 Isomorphism and its limitation
At the end of the eighties, the term ‘isomorphism’ has been introduced into the
discussion of legal knowledge based systems and formalizing law. In Karpf [22] we
find five conditions that have been listed in Bench-Capon and Coenen [5] as the
following:
(i) Each legal source is presented separately.
(ii) The representation preserves the structure of each legal source.
(iii) The representation preserves the traditional mutual relation, references and con-
nections between the legal sources.
(iv) The representation of the legal sources and their mutual relations (...) is sepa-
rate from all other parts of the model, notably representation of queries and facts
management.
(v) If procedural law is part of the domain of the model then the law module will
have representation of material as well as procedural rules and it is demanded that
the whole system functions in accordance with and in the order following the pro-
cedural rules.
Practically, (ii) is what matters the most, the short or narrow references at least
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refer to isomorphism mainly covering that: Bench-Capon and Coenen [5] sum up
presenting the rules above with saying that “the important demand made by iso-
morphism is that there is a clear correspondence between items to be found in the
source material and items to be found in the knowledge base. (...) Where one to one
correspondence is not achieved, however, it is important to relax the constraint only
so that one source item corresponds to several knowledge base items and maintain
the prohibition on a single knowledge base item capturing the material from several
source items.” The definition we see in Prakken and Schrickx [29] is quite similar:
“the situation that one source unit is formalised in one knowledge base unit. By
source unit we mean the smallest identifiable unit of the source from which a norm
can be extracted. In general this will be a section or a subsection of a code.”
Bench-Capon and Coenen [5] convincingly argue that following these rules greatly
help to satisfy the concerns of well engineered knowledge systems presented in Jack-
son [19]: verification, validation, and maintenance. They argue that isomorphic for-
malization also helps the user: “Many of the problems with experts systems come
from a mismatch between the rule based conceptualisation of the expert system and
the conceptualisation of the user.” (Here the authors do not discuss the potential
users of expert systems but Bench-Capon does so in [4].) We come back later to the
question of users and mismatches between concept structures.
But not only software engineering considerations serve arguments for isomorphism.
In Gordon [17] and Bench-Capon and Gordon [6] we find legal theoretical consid-
erations on legistics about reasons behind the typical structure of laws providing
the general rule first and then a number of specific exceptions. According to the
authors, this structure reflects on a need coming from the addressees’ side. As Gor-
don [17] says: “This [structure] facilitates the normative function of the law; the law
would have little effect on social behaviour if its rules were so convoluted that per-
sons could only with great difficulty, if at all, predict the legal consequences of their
actions.” According to Bench-Capon and Gordon [6], this presentation structure of
general rules and exceptions helps achieve “ease of application, ease of understand-
ing, and the possibility of allocating the burden of proof”—points that can be upheld
with keeping on isomorphism when formalizing. In Prakken and Schrickx [29] a few
years before, the structure above is yet presented as a threat to, or a limitation
of isomorphism, which, however, can be overcome (building up formalization upon
nonmonotonic reasoning or conflict solving metarules), as it is presented in the paper.
There are other limitations brought up in the literature, though. Bench-Capon and
Coenen [5] refer to Sergot et al. [34] as latently raising objections against isomophism.
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It is the critique of isomorphism which is latent in Sergot et al.[34] as it is not even
mentioned literally since the paper is about following a top down development of
logic programming when formalizing the Indian pension rules, but the criticism of
the isomorphic approach can be read clearly from it. As Bench-Capon and Coenen
[5] rephrase it: “the isomorphism approach is very well if the legislation is itself well
stuctured. In such a case, the structure of the problem, the structure of the legisla-
tion, and the structure of an isomorphic knowledge base would all be in harmony. It
is, however, often the case that the legislation is not well structured. Often repeated
amendments and ‘patching’ mean that the legislation is itself a complete mess, and
fails to reflect the real structure of the domain. In such a case, basing the structure
of the knowledge base on legislation would lead to a poorly structured knowledge
base, which fails to correspond to the ‘real world’ problem.” With Sergot et al. [34]
own words: “in common with many other examples of legislation and regulations,
especially those that refer to periods of time, the Pension Rules are imprecise and
very casual about many of the key concepts. They are certainly not precise enough
to be formulated directly as an executable program, and they are arguably not pre-
cise enough to be applied by a human agent either.” At their reaction, Bench-Capon
and Coenen [5] put a light on the question what is meant by ‘poorly structured’—a
point to which we come back soon—, and argue by turning the objection into a good
argument for isomorphism: a poorly structured legislative text very likely becomes
subject of amendment, which requires maintenance of our knowledge base—which
something that can be efficiently done if we previously followed the isomorphic ap-
proach.
At this point, accepting Bench-Capon and Coenen [5]’s reply (and original argu-
ments above), one might be convinced that isomorphism is an obviously advanta-
geous approach when formalizing legal rules, one definitely to pursue, and this whole
problem urging us to give it up only came up because we wanted to extract real (reg-
ulative) norms from constitutive ones, so we should not do so; examples (3) and (4)
refer to actions of official agents/government organizations, so if we would like to
help people to comply with law, these can be kept as they are: in descriptive form
about what happens in law. In total agreement with the first part of this conclusion,
getting rid of the intention to change constitutive into regulative norms won’t solve
the problem: we encounter it in case of clearly regulative rules, too. Let’s have a
look at an example looking for a norm in clearly regulative rules.
Rules on advertising (Hungarian Act XLVIII of 2008 on advertising and parts of
the Act LVII of 1997 on Fair Competition—which parts earlier were parts of the Act
XLVIII of 2008) are full of rules like the following ones:
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Example(s) (7)
“Advertising is prohibited for goods whose production or marketing is forbidden.”
“Advertisements inciting violent, or personal or public security threatening behav-
ior, are prohibited.”
“Comparative advertising may not injure the reputation of another company or the
name, merchandise, brand name and other marking of such company.”
From the first two, we cannot identify any subject (addressee), from the third,
linguistically, we can: the advertising itself. But the advertising or advertisement is
clearly not an agent in the sense of being capable of conducting actions, therefore one
whose behaviour could be ruled or influenced by imposing a prohibition. Therefore,
the advertising (or advertisement) itself cannot be the addressee. But then who is it?
Who should see to it that a comparative advertisement does not injure the reputa-
tion of other companies? There are several general laws in a society—a phenomenon
because of which the harmfulness of the tendency of forgetting about the addressee
is not so conspicuous—, the criminal code or the civil code are ones concerning all
members of a given society. Is this Act on advertising is one of those? Obviously not,
as most people of a given society have absolutely no influence on what happens in
advertising. Fortunately, the—overwhelming majority of—legislative texts provide
their personal scope in one of the first sections, that is, they denote the agents who
shall comply with them. In case of the Act on advertising this section declaring the
personal scope does not provide the final solution yet since there are three agents
denoted: the advertiser (the company whose product/service the advertisement is
about), the advertising service providers (practically the agencies), and the publish-
ers of advertising (the TV and radio companies, the publishers, etc.). From this we
could conclude that there are three agents on whom the duties above are imposed.
This is not far from the truth, but the situation is a bit more complicated: after
checking the beginning of the Act in order to find the agents and put them into the
norms we would like to extract, we need to check some sections at the end of the
Act, too. After providing the rules in the above form, the legislator put a subtitle
(which is one of the possible units of Hungarian legislative texts), the ‘Vested re-
sponsibility’. This part tells us which addressee will be liable for the violation of a
given prohibition above (listed protractedly in the Act)—which practically means
that the given agent is the one which is obliged to obey the rule (sometimes the
three addressee have joint and several liability—which is a specific problem in terms
of formalization, one which we do not discuss here, though—, some rules need to
be complied with by one or another of the agents (aligning the reasonable aspect of
which phase can be influenced of creating and publishing an advertisement)). If we
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want to have proper complete norms containing the addressee too (which would be
nice considering the information need to be extracted for compliance), we need to
get that information from another parts of the Act, not the one where the “main
rule” can be found.
We, of course, could say that, in order to keep isomorphism, we formalize them
separately when the prohibitions above (let’s call (any of) them Rule Nr. N):
Rule Nr. N: ‘it is obligatory that action A is executed / that C is the case’
and then the “rules” in the section on vested responsibility in a way that:
‘it is obligatory to subject S to comply with the rule Nr. N ’, that is,
‘it is obligatory to subject S to fulfil the obligation in rule Nr. N ’
but this result is rather redundant.
But then what could we do with the laws similar to the Act on advertising (of
which there are a lot) in “ruling” the agents in separate norms? Annotating the
knowledge base slots with the locution in the source (legislative) text could serve
as a solution. Do we lose isomorphism? It depends on how strictly we interpret its
definition. As it is mentioned above, in Prakken and Schrickx [29] we see one saying
that we need to consider one source unit (whose correspondence with one knowledge
base unit should be upheld) as the smallest identifiable unit of the source from which
a norm can be extracted. Well, in this case it is the whole Act itself—a “structural
unit” that authors would scarcely accept as such: representing the whole Act in one
unit of the knowledge base would completely contradict to what we consider as one
unit. We, therefore, seem to be in the need of loosen up the requirement. A require-
ment of an algorithmizable correspondence would still be considerable as substantial
help in pursuing the software engineering concerns of verification, validation, and
maintenance.
One could say that the Act on advertising is a good example of the poorly structured
legislative texts Sergot et al. [34] talk about. It is important to emphasize: this is not
the case. Of course, it depends on, as Bench-Capon and Coenen [5] note, what we call
‘poor structure’, but in the case of the original example of being poorly structured,
the Indian pension rules, the authors found that the same word was used to refer to
slightly different things, sometimes even in the same sentence, while in other cases
the key concepts were really casually phrased. In the Act on advertising there is no
such problem. There is nothing ‘poor’ from a legal point of view or, specifically, from
the viewpoint of legistics in this Act’s structure. It is, actually, a well structured law.
What is behind the structure of this Act then? From legal theoretical point of view
we can call the attention to the fact that advertising law is an area of law aiming
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at the protection of consumers and fair competition. The legislator’s view reflects
on this aim and the viewpoint of the consumer/other companies, thus, instead of
concentrating on the obligations of each concerned agent, the legislator ends up in
listing the situations that should not be realized (as for the consumer it does not
make a difference which agent is responsible for a given undesirable situation).
We need to distinguish two phenomena Sergot et al. [34] talk about, at least we
need to reflect more precisely their relationship. The—clearly problematic—practice
of handling concepts and terminology poorly is a sufficient condition of not having
matching with the real world problem structure, but far from being necessary. The
legal (more precisely, legislative) mapping of the world is not isomorphic with the
world itself. In Ződi [44] we find an—experiment-supported—analysis of the compre-
hensibility of legal texts. The author’s conclusion is that changing the often scolded
legal language would not solve the problem that people find it difficult to understand
the legal (not just legislative) texts. Offering a classification of three kinds of prag-
matic situations where laymen meet legal texts, Ződi points out that the difficulties
in understanding legal texts should be investigated together with these situations
and not just the syntactical and semantical features of legal texts. He emphasizes:
“the texts of legal sources are not organized around everyday problems—they follow
a different logic. (...) The texts of legal sources are mainly organized around theo-
retical legal ‘fields’, and try to avoid redundancies. Therefore, even for a very simple
contractual problem the answer will lie in many places. (...) One is involved in a car
accident: there are the rules of the traffic code, rules of the penal law (code), rules
of obligatory third-party insurance, and rules for the whole procedure, including the
usage of forms, and so on. And even if texts are found, circumstances are fixed, and
proper interpretation is in place, the question still remains: What follows from all
these rules? What should I do? Where should I go? What should I write down, fill
out, submit? Who should I inform, call? And so on.”
In an ideal case, a knowledge base system can mediate between the two: faithfully
represents the law (where faithfulness, as we saw, does not necessarily mean isomor-
phism, especially not verbatim as Johnson and Mead [20] advocate), and is built
up in a way that with normative reasoning can help people find answers to their
question in a real life problem. Expecting that the law itself is structured in a way
that its verbatim formalizing (if it makes sense at all in terms of feasibility) provides
all the answers to real life problems would be reasonable if we thought the legislative
texts themselves as doing so. But according to Ződi [44]—and the experience—this
is not the case. This mediating task is exactly something because of which building
legal knowledge base systems would provide a real contribution. This requires legal
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theoretical knowledge (and of course knowledge of the given legal domain) when
constructing. Again, this is the ideal case, presupposing that we want a system for
information extraction useful to laymen (too). It can be the case that our target audi-
ence is different: specific types of adjudicators. About this case, see Bench-Capon [4].
One might feel at this point that the requirement of extracting (regulative) norms
demands too many sacrifices, so we should be satisfied with constitutive norms in
their “normal, descriptive form”, what is more, regulative norms should be rephrased
as constitutive ones, too, in order to avoid any complication. Unfortunately, from a
legal theoretical or philosophical point of view, consequentially leaning on constitu-
tive rules also has a strong limitation.
5 Dealing with Constitutive Norms in Law and Its Lim-
itation
As it has been mentioned earlier in this paper, there is a view advocating that there
is no real difference between these two types of the norms. It might mean that what
we call regulative norms, can be rephrased in the way ‘constitutive ones’ are phrased,
that is, exactly in the other way around than we have pursued in this paper so far.
The possibility is appealing: we don’t need to deal with normative reasoning or
deontic logic, we have simple descriptive propositions. We cannot even argue with
calling attention to the presence of deontic mo dalities since Searle only said that
constitutive rules are mostly phrased in indicative mood, did not say that this hap-
pens always: the fact that we find rules using ‘ought to’ and ‘obligatory’ in the law
of contracts supports this thesis: we all know that if we infringe some of this rule,
what comes is not a punishment, but the nullity of the contract—which is actually
not a contract then. And the solution of resolving regulative norms into constitutive
norms seems to be easy: an obliging norm can be translated into a conditional sen-
tence saying that if the given action is not conducted, then it is a violation.8 Saying
so we already have a paradigmatic constitutive rule: not performing the given action
counts as a violation. If it is so easy to lean on constitutive rules when formalizing
law, what is the problem?
Let’s see a new example. The Hungarian traffic rules are a set of norms—we can call
8This approach is used when defining specifications for instance in LegalRuleML, see Athan et
al. [2] and this thought was the basis of the Andersonian-Kangerian reduction of deontic logic, see
Anderson [1] and Kanger [21].
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their set as the Highway Code, in Hungarian we use the acronym KRESZ—that look
like the classical examples of constitutive rules: the rules of a game. Some rules are
general during “playing” (participating in public road use), but the obliging rules
are mostly given in a very similar way it happens in board games: if you land on
this and that square, you have to do this and that—if you see this and that sign (an
octagon with the string ‘STOP’, down triangle with red edge, circle with red edge
and a number in it, etc.), you have to (or should not) do this and that (stop, give
priority, go with a specific speed, etc.). This and that (things in the world) count
as this and that (pedestrian way, public road, traffic sign). Even the topographical
feature comes, and given situations result in a situation when you miss a (or more)
turn(s): your driving license is taken. For a moment we might become uncertain if
we thought to ‘walking’ and ‘going by car’ as actions that we do anyway, that is,
are not defined by these rules. Sure, we can do these: in our home or at our land,
we can walk and use our car in any way we would like to, but the whole system of
public road use is defined by these rules. In Hungary, traffic rules are contained in
the 1/1975 (II.5.) joint decree of Minister of Traffic and Minister of Internal Affairs
on public road traffic rules, and this statute—not like others—does not contain any-
thing about the consequences of infringing the rules it sets. In Roman law this was
called ‘lex imperfecta’: a law imposing no consequence on its breaching cannot fulfil
its role, it is not a proper law. It of course does not mean that in Hungary, breach-
ing traffic rules have no consequences: it has, but these consequences are handled in
another law (mostly in the Act on misdemeanors). This structure strengthens the
feeling that the traffic rules are just a specific set of rules of a game—the game called
public road use.
But we should be cautious with this conclusion. This constitutive rules approach of
law has an unwanted consequence: as it has been already referred above, constitutive
rules have a definition in Rawls [30] according to which if we do not follow these
rules, we do not engage with the action itself. But having said that, with breaching
the traffic rules, we getting out of the scope of the given law (in case of KRESZ the
decree above)—but then what serves as a basis to the policeman to impose a fine?
Paying money is something that has nothing to do with the “game rules”: we work,
earn and spend money independently from the public road use, the word ‘money’
does not even appear in the text of the decree. It’s clearly something that is out
of the frame imposed by the traffic rules, we are still exposed to it by breaching
them. It is because the system of law is not something discerptible from our life like
football or chess is. It provides the structure of our life and—especially—our society
in many ways, so thinking about its rules as merely constitutive rules just because
there are institutions created by it comes with a controversial consequence. I don’t
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claim that constitutive rules as such make no sense in law: they do—especially the
approach we find in Ross [32] about constitutive rules as a manageable and effective
technique of presentation of a system of norms as we can connect a set of concrete
circumstances to a set of legal consequences by them. But there are always legal
consequences.
6 Conclusion
Pursuing extracting norms from legislative text is a reasonable task, just like the
presupposition that it can be conducted. As we saw, at least in the Hungarian leg-
islation, there are challenging examples of identifying and extracting the deontic
character of the legal norms we would like to have in our knowledge base systems,
especially if we would like to use (semi-)automatized methods. This task becomes
even more challenging with that, as I argued, it is not reasonable to take isomor-
phism as a general requirement that should be met, as it not always can be met,
even in the case of well structured legislative texts. The strength of this conclusion,
of course, might vary according to the goal pursued by the formal representation,
but in the case of extracting norms in a way it serves a legal knowledge base which
faithfully represents the law and, at the same time, which might be subject of nor-
mative reasoning helping for example compliance of agents, being faithful probably
won’t (cannot) be equal with insisting isomorphism—even in the case of well struc-
tured norms. This good structure, though—having a labelled section providing the
agents for instance—gives the opportunity to have another requirement somewhat
looser than isomorphism, the algorithmizable correspondence using solutions like an-
notating the knowledge base slots with the locution in the source (legislative) text.
Clusters of different—more specific—technical solutions might be developed accord-
ing (and corresponding) to different legislative techniques. I also argued in this paper
that leaning on constitutive norms—especially in their Rawlsian definition—when
formalizing law brings very problematic result as breaching a rule would end up in
getting out of the scope of the law, that is, per definitionem not being liable for
breaching it.
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